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I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant is being sued for attorney's fees for 
services· rendered by the Plaintiff in the amount of $920.56. 
(R 2,3) No responsive pleading was filed and a default judgment 
was taken (R 17). The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to 
set aside default which was denied. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied the Defendant's motion to set 
aside default judgment. 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks affirmation of the court's order 
denying the Defendant's motion to set aside default. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff differs with the Defendant's Statement 
of the Facts in several material respects: 
-1-
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Plaintiff's Complaint was filed 
(R 2) 
The Defendant was served 
(R 8) 
No responsive pleading was filed and a 
judgment by default \las entered against 
the Defendant 
(R 17) 
The Defendant subsequently filed a motion 
to dismiss on 
(R 18) 
The Defendant filed a motion to set aside 
default on 
114 days after the default judgment was entered 
(R 23) 
The court denied the Defendant's motion on 
(R 54) 
v. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
A. 
April 19, 1978 
April 19, 1978 
June 12, 1978 
June 27, 1978 
October 19, 1978 
October 25, 1978 
The Defendant is precluded from bringing a Motion to 
Set Aside Default on the grounds of inadvertance, surprise or 
excusable neglect. 
The issues in the case are governed by the provision 
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. rhe Rule 
provides as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
-2-
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or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (7) 
any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(2), (3) or (4), not more than three months after 
the judgment, order or procee.ding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This Rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding to to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these Rules or by an independent 
action." 
Normally, the type of motion filed by Defendant would 
be on the grounds of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable 
neglect under subsection (1) of Rule 60(b). Tnis is particularly 
true since it is apparent from Defendant's affidavit that he 
failed to ever mail the original of his motion to dismiss to the 
court prior to the default date (R page 26, paragraph 11) although 
he apparently intended to. The facts are undisputed that so such 
-3-
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motion was received timely by the court (R 18) or by Plaintiff 
(R 40, 41). Defendant's motion was received by the court on June 
27, 197$ although it bares the date of May 11, 1978 and an 
affidavit of mailing of May 11, 1978. These conflicting dates 
render the document suspect. 
The Defendant is precluded from alleging mistake, 
inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect under subsection 
(1) of Rule 60(b) because he didn't file the motion for 114 days 
after the default was entered since Rule 60(b) provides: 
"The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
tine and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4), 
not more than three months after the judgment, 
order or proceedings was entered to taken." 
Defendant, therefore, attempts to ground his motion to set aside 
default on subsection 7 of the rule which he cannot do. 
B. 
There is no other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Subsection (7) provides: 
"Any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." 
The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff is not the real party in 
interest and therefore the judgment cannot stand on that ground 
(Defendant's Brief 4, 5 and 6). That this is not a valid ground 
-4-
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for setting aside a default jugment is demonstrated by two 
Utah cases. 
In the case of Board of Education of Granite School 
District vs. Cox, 14 Utah(2d) 385, 384 P.2d 806, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his descretion 
in refusing to set aside a default judgment under subsection 
(7) where the Defendant asserted that he thought the summons 
was invalid and therefore paid no attention to it. 
In that case, the Defendant also claimed that the 
judgment was based upon a void contract for the reason that the 
contract did not comply with the statute of frauds. The Supreme 
Court held that such an assertion went to the merit of the case 
and could not be considered on a motion to set aside a judgment. 
Subsection (6) of the Federal Rule 60(b) contains 
identical language to that of subsection (7) of the Utah Rules 
.of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). 
In discussing this clause (6) in the Federal Rules, 
Moore's states: 
"It is important to note, however, that clause 
(6) contains two very important internal quali-
fications to its application: first, the motion 
must be based upon some reason other than those 
stated in clauses (1) - (5); and second, the 
other reason urged for relief must be such as to 
justify relief. 
-5-
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"In reference to the first qualification, the 
very cast of the Rule and the language of clause 
(6) indicate that this residual clause is dealing 
with matters not covered in the preceeding five 
clauses. Further, the maximum time limitation 
of one year (3 months in Utah parense material 
added) that applies to clause (1), (2) and (3) 
would be meaningless, if after the year period 
had run the movant could be granted relief under 
clause (6) for reasons covered by clauses (1), 
(2) and (3). Klapport so recognized and held. 
l1oores Vulur:1e 7, pages 343 and 34<f. (Klapport 
vs. United States [19~9] 335 U.S. 601, 336 U.S. 
942, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266)." 
The same reasoning applies to this case and since 
Defendant should have brought his motion under clause or sub-
section (1), he cannot bring it under subsection (7). 
The Defendant failed to set out either in his motion 
or affidavit that he had a meritorious defense. This showing 
is a prerequisite to relief under subsection 7. Moore's Volume 
7 at page 351 states: 
"Supplementing the reason for relief, the moving 
party must ordinarily show a meritorious claim or 
defense. Citing Sebastiana vs. United States 
(ND Ohio 1951) 108 F. Supp 278, 15 F.R. Serv 
60 b. 29, Case 2, aff'd (CA 6th, 1952) 195 
F2d 184, and United States vs. Williams (WD Ark. 
1952) 109 F.Supp 456, 18 FR Serv 60 b. 31, Case 1." 
The Plaintiff in any event is the real party in interest. 
It had merely changed its name. The same entity at all times 
was the Plaintiff and also the entity which rendered the services. 
(R 39, 40, 41). 
-6-
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VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the trial court has broad discretion regarding 
the setting aside of default judgments (Warren vs. Dixon Ranch 
~. 123 U.416, 260 P.2d 741 and Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite 
~. 14 U. (2d) 52, 376 P.2d 951. The decision of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 1979. 
ROBINSON, GUYON, SUMMERHAYS & BARNES 
By~(L/1~ 
oweTl v . SUillii1eThaS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two copies of the 
foregoing briei to the Defendant this 23rd ciay of February, 1979 
by leaving them at his home address of 1395 Chandler Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84103. 
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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------
-----------------------
CATHERINE BORGER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16154 
LEE RAY BORGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce and division of property 
based on the respondent, Catherine Borger's Complaint against 
the appellant, Lee Ray Borger, and on the appellant's counter-
claim against the respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOI<lER COURT 
The trial of this action was had without a jury, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge, presiding 
in the first Judicial District Court, Box Elder County, 
State of Utah. The District Court granted the respondent 
a divorce against the appellant and granted the appellant 
a uivorce against the respondent. The District Court also 
made a Decree dividing the parties' properties. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have this court affirm the decision 
of the trial court judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action were married in Elko, Nevada on 
the lOth day of March, 1970. They did not have any children of 
this marriage. The respondent was previously married to a Mr. 
Reeder and was divorced from him in 1964. There were two 
children of this marriage who are presently 16 and 18 years of 
age whose custody was awarded to the respondent. (T.4) At that 
time, the respondent was awarded the home belonging to the parties 
and Mr. Reeder was given a lien for one-half interest in said 
home. (T.24) At the time of the marriage of the parties to this 
action, there were no financial obligations against the home 
belonging to the respondent except for the lien owing to the 
ex-husband. (T.7) Shortly after their marriage, the appellant 
invested $300.00 of the money he had prior to this marriage in 
the home for carpet and painting. (T.7) 
In 1972, additional improvements were made to the home. 
Two rooms and a carport were added and the home was covered with 
aluminum siding and brick. This was financed with a first 
mortgage placed on the home in the sum of $6,500.00. This 
mortgage was paid off by boi:.h the appellant and the rcs]Jonclcnt 
from their joint income during the marriage ancl the balance 
- 2 -
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owing on said mortgage as of the time of the divorce was 
between $3,000.00 and $3,700.00. (T.9) In 1972, the respondent 
contacted her ex-husband and made arrangements to buy out 
his interest in the home for the sum of $2,500.00. The 
appellant had nothing to do with this arrangement. However, 
the appellant did give the $2,500.00 to the respondent and 
she paid that to her ex-husband. (T.34) The respondent 
places the value of the home at the time at $12,000.00 and 
the appellant claims that it was worth $10,000.00. (T.34, 49) 
The appellant claims in his brief and at the time of 
the trial that he contributed the labor for the improvements 
made on the home in 1972. However, the appellant admitted 
under questioning that during the time he was working on 
the home the respondent was maintaining a joint business 
owned and operated by the parties and that the respondent 
contributed as much time working in the business and at 
home as did the appellant in working on the home. {T.52) 
The parties went into a joint business known as Ray and 
Cathy's Cafe which was opened in 1971 and closed in October, 
1977. This cafe was jointly operated by the parties during 
their marriage. (T.l2) The appellant also admits that any 
and all costs of improving the home were obligations against 
the home that have been paid off with joint income or are 
still owing against said home. (T.53) 
- 3 -
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During the marriage, the parties purchased a 19-foot 
mobile home which was disposed of by the appellant in 1978 
and from which he received $3,000.00 which he reinvested in 
a truck and camper. Six Hundred Dollars of the respondent's 
money from an inheritance was invested in the mobile home as 
well as the payments made on it out of the joint income earned 
by the parties during their marriage. (T.l3, 14, 16) The parties 
also owned a 1966 Hydro-Swift 16-foot boat which the respondent 
values at $1,500.00 and a 1973 Pontiac which the respondent 
values at $950.00. The furniture belonging to the parties was 
owned by the respondent prior to the marriage with the exception 
of a TV, washer and dryer. (T. 15, 16) During the time the 
parties were married, the appellant received the use of the 
home and furniture belonging to the respondent free of any 
charge except for the labor and the payments made on the 
mortgage incurred for the new improvements. (T.7, 35) 
Judge Christoffersen awarded to the appellant the truck 
and camper and the boat. The court awarded to the respondent 
the 1973 Pontiac and the furniture. The respondent was also 
awarded the home subject to a lien in favor of the appellant 
in the sum of $1,225.00. 
Judge Christoffersen found that the appellant did not 
purchase a one-half interest in the home 1vhc>n he contribuLcc_1 
the $2,500.00 which was used to pay off the ex-husband's lien. 
- 4 -
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He also found that the joint monies used to retire the 
mortgage and the joint effort which went into improving 
the horne was offset by the free use of the horne given 
to the appellant during the marriage. The court found 
that the appellant should receive a credit for the 
$2,225.00 paid to the respondent's ex-husband, for the 
$300.00 invested in the carpet and paint during the time of 
the marriage and for one-half of the value of the automobile 
which would be $425.00 making a total of $3,225.00. The 
court found that the respondent was entitled to a credit 
of one-half of the equity obtained from the sale of the 
mobile home and invested into the appellant's truck and 
camper amounting to $1,500.00 and one-half of the equity 
in the boat as estimated by the appellant amounting to 
$500.00 for a total of $2,000.00 credit. The court then 
deducted the $2,000.00 from the $3,225.00 and gave the 
appellant a lien against the horne in the sum of $1,225.00 (T.58-62) 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY THE 
I.VEIGHT OF EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the court 
awarded the home to the respondent with a lien in favor 
of the appellant in the sum of $1,225.00. The court 
awarded to the appellant the truck and camper which the 
court valued at $3,000.00 and the boat which the court 
- 5 -
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valued at $1,000.00. The respondent was awarded the auto-
mobile which was valued at $950.00 and the furniture which she 
owned prior Lo the marriage. The court indicated that no value 
had been placed on the TV which was purchased during the marriage, 
and consequently, the court was unable to use that value at 
reaching any judgment. The court did not award the respondent 
any alimony, but did require the appellant to pay the respondent's 
attorney's fees in the sum of $350.00. The evidence indicated 
that the appellant had a take-home income of approximately 
$700.00 per month and that the respondent had a take-home income 
of approximately $550.00 per month. 
Counsel for the appellant in his brief, claims that the 
trial court's judgment was improper because the appellant pur-
chased a one-half interest in the home in 1972. This position 
of the appellant is totally unsupported by the evidence. The 
evidence is clear that the respondent negotiated with her 
ex-husband and was able to convince him to accept the sum of 
$2,500.00 for his one-half interest in the home. At that time, 
the home was worth approximately $12,000.00. Therefore, it is 
obvious that the $2,500.00 was not for the purpose of purchasing 
the one-half interest in the home. The appellant did advance 
the money that was used to pay off the ex-husband. The respondent 
has always acknowledged that the appellant was cntillt:d to a credit 
for the money he advanced. At the ti the ex-husband gave 
- 6 -
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up his interest in the home, the deed was placed in the joint 
names of the appellant and the respondent. The testimony at 
the trial was that at that time, the parties had no reason 
to believe their marriage was in trouble and were not 
concerned about who owned what. Probably about 90% of 
married couples in the state of Utah place their home in 
joint tenancy and it cannot be concluded from this that the 
appellant was acquiring a one-half interest. It would be 
ridiculous to believe that the respondent would be willing 
to give the appellant a $6,000.00 interest for $2,510.00. 
The appellant also contends that he should have an 
interest in the home because he performed certain work on 
the home. It is true that the appellant, in 1972, performed 
labor on the home that made a significant improvement in the 
home. However, during this time, the appellant and the 
respondent were l'lakin<J their living frol'l a cafe which was 
jointly owned by them. In order for the appellant to have 
enough time to work on the home, the•respondent had to work 
extended hours on the job for which she received no additional 
compensation. The appellant reluctantly admitted at the 
time of the trial that the respondent had contributed as 
much time in running the business and taking care of the 
home as he dil1 in runninc1 the business and doing the work 
on the home. (T.52, line 15) It should also be noted that 
the appellant lived in the home from 1970 until the time 
of the divorce in 1978. During these eight yea~s he used 
- 7 -
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the home and the furniture belonging to the respondent without 
making any payments whatsoever with the exception of the work 
he performed and the retirement of the first mortgage which 
was paid out of the monies earned jointly by the parties. 
It is the position of the respondent that the trial 
court was totally justified in the decision that it made and 
in fact did make a fair an~ equitable distribution of the 
property belonging to the parties. The apoellant has contri-
buted $2,800.00 in cash plus some services for a period of 
eight years and yet wishes to walk away with one-half of the 
assets acquired by the respondent prior to the marriage and 
with a majority of the assets acquired by the parties during 
the marriage. This certainly would not be an equitable result 
and consequently the respondent prays for the court to U?hold 
the lower court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's decision was totally supported by the 
evidence and consequently should be upheld by this court. 
DATED this day of April, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
- 8 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to the attorney 
for the Plaintiff-Appellant, Jack H. Molgard, Esq., at 
P. 0. Box 461, Brigham City, UT 84302, on this the o{0f~ 
day of April, 1979. 
wj~ f2£brxwMAfl6 
JEANNINE C. DAMEvlORTH 
Secretary to Robert A. Echard 
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